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ABSTRACT 
The Very Low Frequency Propagation Mapper, an Air Force Research Laboratory 6U CubeSat, is currently in 
operations complementing the Demonstration and Science Experiments (DSX) satellite by taking coincident 
measurements with DSX of the inner magnetosphere. This presents an exciting way to have a low-cost platform 
enhance an existing mission’s data set with multiple spatial collection points. The Small Satellite Portfolio (SSP) had 
overall responsibility for the vehicle, ground system, and mission design; by enabling the team to make technical and 
programmatic decisions on their own, the team has been able to overcome many hurdles in short timeframes. Further, 
the team was constructed with a diverse set of skills to handle the many complexities of space systems. Finally, the 
team, and SSP as a whole, recognize that changes to the system and mission are not only expected but desired as 
mission maturity is gained. This paper outlines a selected set of issues and challenges that occurred, the ways the team 
dynamically handled the situations, and lessons learned for systems that are constrained in both cost and capability 
(e.g. small satellites).
INTRODUCTION 
The1 Very Low Frequency (VLF) Propagation Mapper 
(VPM) satellite, an Air Force Research Laboratory 
(AFRL) 6U CubeSat, is designed to augment the 
Demonstration and Science Experiments (DSX) 
satellite's VLF transmission experiment being flown by 
AFRL. Small satellites, especially Cube Satellites 
(CubeSats), present an opportunity to enable 
simultaneous observations of the same phenomena in 
fairly low-cost, short timeframes. The ability to augment 
a much larger mission’s data set temporally or spatially 
is essentially unprecedented within the Air Force and an 
incredible use-case for these platforms. VPM not only 
enhances the DSX mission, it experiments with the 
concept of using small satellite platforms as a key 
                                                          
1 AFMC-2020-0258 
architectural element of a greater mission 
implementation. 
AFRL’s Small Satellite Portfolio (SSP) has been 
designing, integrating, and operating spacecraft that 
have explored the utility of small satellites in Air Force 
applications for about eight years. With each iteration of 
spacecraft, SSP has been able to raise the baseline 
capabilities demonstrated on the CubeSat platform by 
implementing lessons learn from previous spacecraft – 
VPM largely pulled lessons learned from the GEARRS 
1, GEARRS 2, and SHARC missions. The GEARRS 
satellites demonstrated that global telemetry monitoring 
was possible using a Globalstar transmitter designed for 
terrestrial use [3, 4]. VPM was able to implement this 
technology to continuously beacon vehicle state of 
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health telemetry that provides operators with valuable 
insight into the spacecraft globally (and more often than 
line of sight passes). The SHARC spacecraft had many 
similarities to VPM and was pivotal in forming SSP 
spacecraft design philosophies. VPM was able to 
implement lessons learned from SHARC to improve 
vehicle telemetry collection, fault handling and 
automation of uplinking/downlinking to the vehicle. By 
leveraging these lessons, SSP was not only able to build 
a spacecraft to support the VPM science mission, but was 
also able to explore design, execution, and philosophical 
approaches for flight and ground systems. 
The primary, and unique, schedule driver for the VPM 
mission was to be operational simultaneously with the 
DSX spacecraft. Due to the nature of the science 
mission, VPM was required to launch within six months 
of the STP-2 Falcon Heavy on a separate launch vehicle. 
This drove a rapid and reactive development schedule 
with numerous external variables. Despite the 
challenges, VPM launched to the International Space 
Station on 5 December 2019 and began operations upon 
deployment on 1 February 2020. Operations are 
expected to last for at least six months in tandem with 
DSX with goal objectives lasting 12 months (limited 
currently by frequency license). 
Small Satellite Portfolio Mission Design 
The VPM mission was initially conceptualized in 2012 
and has gone through several iterations of the mission 
design cycle before finally reaching full authority to 
proceed in January 2018. Once the DSX launch became 
solidified, so did the need and timeline for VPM. Even 
though VPM is relatively “low-cost, short timeframe” it 
is still a complex system requiring significant resources. 
The mission was kicked off with an initial acquisition 
strategy planning the use of commercial CubeSat 
hardware to support an in-house AFRL developed 
payload. This hybrid approach allowed SSP to internally 
have the objective to assess the capabilities available in 
the CubeSat market while the SSP engineering team 
could react to changes in schedule and launch vehicle 
using creative engineering solutions. 
From the outset, the team had a defined scope and 
prioritized improvements to capabilities (building off of 
the previous missions); this allowed the team to operate 
and make decisions fairly independently within the well-
defined bounding-box. Organizational risk posture was 
defined early and was decided to be fairly accepting. 
Trust was placed in the mission team to iteratively 
prototype solutions to a multitude of problems without 
inducing much process on the iteration/decision making. 
The engineers were encouraged to design and test the 
system with modularity and flexibility in-mind such that 
procurement risks could be taken on various “black-box” 
subsystems. By carefully envisioning each decision’s 
impact on the highest-level mission objectives, rapid 
convergence on a solution was possible without 
significant programmatic burden [5, 6]. VPM was one of 
the use-cases that led to the development of the agile-
inspired system engineering and mission assurance 
approach currently being formalized in SSP [7]. The 
team was enabled to try various execution paths in the 
system design and also to plan for operations; once in 
operations rapid response to issues and small, iterative, 
improvements to capabilities was not only expected, but 
implemented, given that the system design and the “rules 
for engagement” in operations allowed for open ended 
experimentation on orbit. 
The remainder of the paper will discuss in some greater 
detail the above approaches, the issues experienced and 
how they were handled, and outline the process from 
design through operations. 
VPM DESIGN AND INTEGRATION 
SSP missions generally start out with a set of high-level 
mission objective(s) from which minimal and full 
mission success criteria are derived. The system design 
which satisfies these criteria is an open trade space that 
entails, among other things, how the mission team should 
put the bus or space asset together. Rather than a rigid 
set of requirements, the success criteria are an ongoing 
conversation with the mission stakeholders as the system 
evolves and grows in maturity. Procurement options 
include the full spectrum of buy-or-build that seeks to 
leverage the commercial satellite hardware and software 
market whenever possible. Due to the rapidly evolving 
nature of the market and new entrants to capability 
offerings, many components were assessed and adapted 
to meet the desired performance. This evolution was 
expected based on portfolio experience with SHARC 
and other CubeSat missions. A critical choice in system 
level design was to emphasize modular design 
(encapsulated functionalities, not plug-and-play) in both 
hardware and software to permit the lowest possible 
impact when a system required modification or 
replacement. By maintaining a team of engineers with 
hardware and software design skills, the team could 
rapidly prototype and integrate custom solutions to 
overcome gaps or interface mismatches in the 
commercial hardware. All critical electrical interfaces 
were handled with a mission-specific interface card 
designed and populated in-house. This design and the 
associated engineering skill sets allowed new board 
designs to be prototyped, spun and tested within days or 
weeks rather than the usual procurement timelines of 
multiple months. Leveraging the team’s ability to buy or 
build solutions and evolve the mission success criteria to 
match, the mission altered and improved hardware and 
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software interfaces and functionality well into the testing 
phase.  
The VPM team went into development planning to have 
some hardware modification, and saw the flight software 
as the key interfacing element to enabling this process. 
This meant one of the first design decision points in the 
mission development process, before any hardware was 
delivered, was how to address the flight software 
implementation. The VPM team opted to take a modular 
and configurable approach for the flight software 
architecture that could flex with both hardware and 
software design/testing outcomes to still achieve 
success. When presented with challenges in the 
commercially supplied small satellite design-space, it is 
highly valuable to have the team and programmatic 
mentality to accept what cannot be changed, and change 
what can. 
Modular Design 
Having loosely established mission success criteria, the 
team rapidly identified a Minimum Viable Product 
(MVP) or set of capability that the flight software, 
hardware, and ground system needed to provide. Small 
(~5 person) teams were then stood up and co-located as 
close together as feasible to encourage cross-pollination 
[7]. Rather than a full requirements derivation, the MVP 
approach allowed the hardware, software and ground 
teams to take their minimum functionality and 
decompose internally to the level they required. This 
MVP incorporated lessons learned from previous 
missions: fault handling, parallel development, engineer-
led operations, etc. While greater than the absolute bare-
minimum set of functionalities, it was determined to be 
the absolute lowest bar of capability to be worth 
delivering to orbit.  
To marry with the hybrid hardware solution, the teams 
selected the Radiant flight software. Radiant, at its core, 
is a modular reusable open-network software 
development framework targeted at space systems and 
space systems development. This is SSP's first time 
using Radiant for a mission, and the first time a Radiant-
based space system is delivered to orbit. Significant 
consideration was put into the flight software trade, but 
it was done early and decisively by the team and SSP 
leadership. This proved to be an enabling decision 
throughout the development and testing process. It 
should be noted that Radiant core capability exceeded 
MVP in many cases, but required developing hardware-
specific applications for all the hardware components, 
with some reuse from SHARC (e.g. GPS App). Radiant's 
modularity and network interfacing of the flight software 
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provided simple integration with AI&T ground software 
tools allowing the team to “test as you fly” through a 
COSMOS2[9] interface from Day 1. It was also a 
tremendous asset to have the source code accessible to 
the team, and due to the fact that SDL utilizes Radiant on 
multiple missions, the code base also had developers 
from other missions outside SSP contributing.  
The flight software rapid development strategy included 
several other attributes that yield dividends across 
multiple SSP missions: 
1. Leverage agile software approaches. 
2. Utilize a development framework for 
integrating hardware and payloads via serial, 
Ethernet, Spacewire, USB, and I2C. 
3. Streamline process of supporting new/existing 
spacecraft hardware buses. 
4. Grow "library" of examples and hardware 
support. 
5. Leverage automatic code generation for 
command and telemetry messaging and 
COSMOS integration. 
Flight Software Design 
Radiant is based on SSM [9-13], which is a modular 
reusable open-network software development 
framework. SSM was the middleware layer for the flight 
software used on SHARC and had been an enabling 
technology for that mission. Radiant encompasses a set 
of core flight software services that ride on top of SSM 
as the Core Flight Software (FSW) layer shown in Figure 
1, the inter-process communication fabric in this case is 
network based.  
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Figure 1: Flight software layers. 
This middleware layer allows all the core and mission-
specific Apps and services to talk to each other without 
being tightly coupled. Modularity enables reuse, and 
good abstraction and encapsulation enable modularity 
[1, 2]. The Middleware and Core FSW layers can be 
reused almost wholly across missions with bug fixes and 
new features being added. The Component Apps can be 
reused when using the same hardware allowing for a 
library of hardware to be built up. This allows developers 
the ability to leverage as much existing capability as 
possible going into each mission, to rapidly prototype, 
and to see what doesn't work. 
With a core in place and a modular approach for 
interfacing with each hardware system the flight 
software became the enabling technology for meeting 
hardware milestones and providing support for 
integration testing as needed. This helps the entire 
system be resilient to change and promote reuse of the 
support Apps if hardware is reused on other missions. 
Modularity and the GPS Subsystem 
The modular architecture, with well-defined interfaces 
for connecting components, allows for parallel 
development efforts and decouples changes or failures in 
hardware from dependent or interrelated components 
from affecting one another. This resiliency to change is 
illustrated by GPS subsystem modifications made during 
VPM's development cycle. The first generation of 
commercial GPS interface board requires an I2C 
interface for local control and a UART direct to the GPS 
receiver. This adapter board suffered a latent electrical 
failure during test. The VPM team opted to simply 
remove the carrier board and develop a bare-minimum 
interface board that did not require a management 
software interface. While software development time 
was lost with the removal of the I2C carrier board and 
the board's associated software module, the rest of the 
transition took place within two weeks. The FSW team 
absorbed a great deal of the failed board’s functionality 
through additional configuration, e.g. startup and 
telemetry processing. However, no additional changes to 
the overall flight software were needed because of low 
coupling, good modularity, and good encapsulation. 
Further, the broad skillset hardware team easily handled 
the design and fabrication of an interface board. 
OPERATIONS 
Much like AI&T, the SSP team expected to encounter 
anomalies and prepared to resolve or mitigate them (for 
instance, the operations team was not trained to specific 
procedures but focused on key activities so that desired 
outcomes were known and the team could adapt and 
problem solve to achieve success). Anomalies on orbit 
require more creative solutions than the AI&T floor but 
the same understanding and careful troubleshooting as 
hands-on debugging. For VPM, this opportunity 
presented itself immediately after deployment. This 
section will discuss some of the anomalies seen on VPM 
during early operations and how the team responded to 
overcome the anomalies. 
Deployment and designing for a tumble 
VPM’s initial deployment CONOPS was to 
automatically deploy the solar panels, detumble, and go 
into a 3-axis stabilized sun pointing mode without 
operator intervention. This level of automation is not 
uncommon, but it is a higher risk acceptance stance than 
many missions take. The decision to allow the vehicle to 
achieve this high level of functionality was based on the 
premise that should issues arise, VPM has  implemented 
SSP’s design principles for surviving an uncontrolled 
attitude state: 
1. Spacecraft power systems shall be capable of 
generating power to operate in a safe mode 
while attitude is uncontrolled. 
2. Telemetry shall be received by the operator in a 
tumble without fine knowledge of spacecraft 
position. 
3. Radio uplinks shall be able to close in a tumble 
[6]. 
Thus a higher functionality, higher risk operation, 
resides on the backbone of a resilient design feature. 
In order to implement the first design principle, VPM 
implemented a set of spacecraft modes below the 
nominal operations modes: sun safe, survival, and 
phoenix modes. With each demotion of mode, both 
power consumption and spacecraft capability were 
reduced. The second design principle was accomplished 
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using a Globalstar transmit-only modem to beacon out 
spacecraft state of health telemetry. The third design 
principle was implemented using patch antennas with a 
simple antenna switching algorithm to achieve a near-
omnidirectional antenna beam pattern. 
VPM utilized all three implementations of designing for 
a tumble immediately following kickoff. On the first day 
of operations, using the Globalstar beacon, the team was 
able to determine that when VPM was deployed, it 
successfully executed the hazardous operations timer 
and deployed the solar panels. However, the spacecraft 
was not de-tumbling and was power negative. VPM 
quickly transitioned to survival mode, but the spacecraft 
was still not power positive in the tumble with even the 
bare minimum of functional avionics and software 
running. For the next 10 days, the spacecraft existed in a 
power negative state transitioning between the off-
nominal spacecraft modes.  
Spacecraft power systems should survive a tumble 
The EPS subsystem on VPM was sized to be 
significantly larger than required by the nominal 
operational power environment (driven by payload 
operations and attitude state) to account for a tumbling 
scenario. VPM was constrained to a 'flower petal' solar 
panel configuration (Figure 2) because of the many 
antennas and externally mounted sensors, so there were 
many tumble scenarios that VPM could be power 
negative (i.e. the entire “back” hemisphere of the 
spacecraft’s field of view).  
 
Figure 2: The VPM spacecraft with solar panels and 
antennas deployed. 
This led to implementing automatic mode transitions 
based on battery voltage. The default mode following the 
hazardous operations period was sun safe mode; this 
mode had all of the VPM bus subsystems powered. In 
the case of a low battery, the system would fault into 
survival mode; this mode would power off the ADCS 
and GPSR subsystems to conserve power, but retain the 
ability to command the spacecraft and transmit beacons 
to Globalstar. In the case that the spacecraft was still not 
power positive, the system would fault into its phoenix 
mode; this mode is a charge only mode where the EPS 
subsystem cuts power to the reset of the system until high 
enough battery voltage threshold has been achieved (e.g. 
a state of charge hysteresis allowing for some time for 
the vehicle to attempt to recover, achieve ground contact, 
etc.). 
There were three main factors that allowed the spacecraft 
to become power positive enough to allow tumble 
recovery:  
1. Changing the default boot mode to survival 
allowing for longer up-time 
2. Seasonally increasing illumination period 
3. A very-slowly precessing tumble 
When the spacecraft was booted back up after the 
phoenix mode charge period had completed, it would 
nominally set the spacecraft to sun safe mode and remain 
there for at least one hour – this was to allow the ADCS 
time to attempt to continue its detumble mode. This 
meant that the spacecraft spent an hour of its operable 
time futilely trying to de-tumble the spacecraft which 
depleted the batteries much quicker than anticipated. 
Thus, the first command that was sent was to update the 
default boot mode to survival mode; this change gave the 
VPM team much higher likelihood of having a line of 
site pass where the spacecraft was in an operable mode. 
The other large factor in survival mode turning into a 
power positive mode was an increasing illumination 
period; when VPM deployed it had the shortest time in 
sun for the orbit. For the first 10 days of operations, VPM 
rebooted 53 times, but the time spent in phoenix mode 
was slowly reducing. On the tenth day, the operators 
were able to upload and execute a command sequence to 
test a fix in the ADCS subsystem. Less than 5% of total 
system momentum was dissipated by the magnetic 
torque rods in this test of approximately 1 hour. From 
then on, the satellite was power positive in its tumbling 
survival mode. This even slightly reduced tumble rate 
likely enabled the EPS maximum power point tracker 
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algorithm to track power more effectively and the 
vehicle was recovered. 
Telemetry should be able to be received in a tumble 
without fine knowledge of spacecraft position 
The Globalstar beaconing feature on VPM (Figure 3) 
was designed based on experience from the GEARRS 
and SHARC satellites; both of those satellites showed a 
relatively high efficiency of beacon receipt in a tumble. 
The VPM design did not account for the change in 
Globalstar modem though; GEARRS and SHARC both 
used the STX2 modem, but VPM used the newer STX3 
modem. The new modem only has an effective radiated 
power of 96mW which is approximately 1.6 dB less than 
the STX2 modem3. 
GEARRS 2 demonstrated a beacon efficiency of around 
75% efficiency in a tumble of approximately 6 degrees / 
sec from an elliptical orbit of 350 km x 700 km at 55 
degrees inclination [3]. VPM is demonstrating a beacon 
efficiency of around 30% in a controlled spin of 0.4 - 0.8 
degrees /sec in a 460 km, circular orbit at 52 degrees 
inclination. 
 
 
Figure 3: Received “complete” beacons for VPM, demonstrating global reception.
The beacon efficiency was significantly worse in the 
high rate tumble – this made predicting when the 
spacecraft was in an operable mode very difficult for 
operators. In order to better understand the phasing of 
spacecraft mode over time, the VPM team obtained a 
Globalstar report that outlined when partial beacons 
were received (Figure 4).  
                                                          
3 https://fccid.io/L2V-STX2-1; https://fccid.io/L2V-
STX3 
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Figure 4: Beacon reception for partial beacons (< 
36B) and full beacons. Reception rate for this period 
was 24%. 
This report confirmed that VPM was alive but tumbling 
too fast to get all four required packets of a beacon 
reliably, but could still get individual messages through 
the Globalstar constellation. In the tumble following 
deployment, VPM was having less than 5% success on 
complete beacons, but approximately 20% success on 
receiving a partial beacon before the phoenix mode cycle 
started. Both the partial and complete beacons proved to 
be valuable despite the significantly reduced rate at 
which they were received. Partial beacons could not be 
interpreted, but the mere presence of a partial beacon 
helped to determine the power state of the spacecraft, 
especially when paired with complete beacons. In 
addition, complete beacons verified that the solar panels 
were fully deployed, subsystem power draws were 
nominal, temperatures were nominal, and surprisingly, 
spacecraft position, velocity, and time were occasionally 
received. 
Radio links should be able to close in a tumble 
There was significant, tested, margin on the telemetry, 
tracking, and command (TT&C) link budget, and the 
spacecraft could close link in the fast tumble. There were 
many compounding issues working against the team 
while tumbling on Day 1. CubeSats often deploy in large 
clusters and VPM was no different with 18 new objects 
in its deployment group. This required significant 
conversation with the antenna operator throughout 
LEOPS to identify the object and track the uncertain 
two-line elements (TLEs) generated in the first days and 
weeks. Coupled with the uncertainty of spacecraft power 
and the potential for seeing one of the known radio bugs, 
anxiety was high that communications would work, 
despite confidence in the link budget. After several days, 
beacons where received with valid GPS position, 
velocity, and time, and the VPM team worked closely 
with the ground station engineers and antenna operators 
to fence the spacecraft and apply a shift in time to the 
TLE being used. 
This more accurate ephemeris and continuous 
improvements to the ground software removed variables, 
allowed confidence to build, and gave the team the 
chance to send one crucial command, then another, and 
another until the system stabilized. Note that originally 
the plan was for the Globalstar beacon to transmit the 
spacecraft’s GPS position once the system had 
detumbled. This nominally would have allowed the team 
to quickly and accurately point ground antennas without 
requiring early, ambiguous TLE use. With the 
intermittent GPS signal and the shift to booting to 
survival mode, where GPS was unpowered, this was not 
generally possible.   
Tumble root cause and on orbit repair 
When attempting to identify the root cause of the tumble, 
the VPM team had very little access to telemetry; 
furthermore, once the cause was identified, the team had 
to work around having spotty commanding to the 
spacecraft. As the TT&C link became more reliable (e.g. 
the orbital position was understood and power 
generation marginally improved), the team was able to 
debug the attitude anomaly: an incorrectly reporting 
magnetometer. During final vehicle assembly, the 
externally mounted sun sensor/magnetometer was short 
circuited due to the package being installed upside down. 
When this error was found during AI&T, the team did its 
due diligence to ensure the sun sensor was not damaged 
(it was still functional), but was unaware that the package 
also included a magnetometer. The team documented the 
failure and proceeded with assembly. Given the damaged 
magnetometer was required by the autonomous 
detumble algorithm, action needed to be taken on orbit 
to recover the spacecraft from the tumble. The damaged 
sensor had caused the system to induce a tumble of 
approximately 15 deg/sec in two axes, and an estimated 
40 deg/sec in the third. Through discussion with the 
ADCS provider, a path forward was identified. The 
ADCS had the option to change the magnetometer used 
by its algorithms, so if the secondary magnetometer was 
still functional, then VPM could detumble. The solution 
was relatively simple given the flexibility of the flight 
software and ADCS system, but made difficult by the 
spacecraft state of health. All Radiant hardware 
applications included a raw pass-through command to 
send any new commands that might become necessary 
on-orbit. A command sequence was uploaded to the 
spacecraft that would execute a series of raw ADCS 
commands. The team opted to create two command 
sequences: the first would be used to verify the 
secondary magnetometer’s functionality, and the second 
would permanently set the secondary magnetometer as 
the default. These command sequences were quickly 
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implemented and tested against simulated hardware as 
VPM did not have a flatsat against which to verify the 
commands. Once the command sequences were ready 
for upload, the VPM team was able to upload the 
command sequences, verify the secondary 
magnetometer functionality (Figure 5), and begin the 
detumble process in just three days. 
 
Figure 5: Broken magnetometer (first 7 seconds) and 
undamaged magnetometer. The magnetometer 
measuring the field “B” was notibly below expected 
values for VPM’s location in orbit, indicating 
damage. The undamaged magnetometer shows 
magnitude near expectations. (Magnetic field vector 
components and magnitudes shown in the plot.) 
Given the power negative state of the spacecraft, it was 
expected that multiple power cycles of the system would 
be required to fully detumble and begin sun pointing, but 
the spacecraft was able to accomplish this with no 
phoenix mode reboots (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6: VPM battery voltage/state of charge as 
detumble occurred. Phoenix mode would occur at 
6.5V on the batteries. 
That was surprising as it took 16 hours for the satellite to 
fully detumble (Figure 7), which was significantly 
longer than the expected duration of a spacecraft survival 
mode power state. This was likely due to a combination 
of an increasing illumination period and naturally 
varying tumble state. The VPM team’s design choices, 
planning for anomalies, allowed the spacecraft to be 
recovered from this potentially mission ending event. In 
the end, the system was one integration error away from 
achieving an aggressive, automated on-orbit 
commissioning sequence.
 
Figure 7: Measured body rates as detumble occurred over 16 hours. Note z-axis is initially saturated. Full 
three axis control recovered under 2 deg/s tumble rates, right at the end of the timeframe. 
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OUTCOMES AND FUTURE OUTLOOK 
Outcomes 
VPM has been very useful to SSP for providing some 
demonstration and validation of designs as well as 
practices. Having a team enabled to make corrections 
and iterations quickly is pivotal. Further, having hands-
on hardware as early as possible enables interface 
debugging and time with higher and higher levels of 
integration provides confidence in system behaviors. 
Finally, doing these things and accepting that operations, 
especially commissioning, is partially an extension of 
test activities where system behaviors are being 
discovered and potentially debugged, has led to 
continual improvements in how the VPM mission is 
accomplished. 
One key example of this mentality continuing through 
operations is the fact that the team, due to COVID-19 
impacts, shifted operations from an on-base operations 
center to the capability to securely operate the spacecraft 
from their homes. The majority of the data chain had 
been deployed into cloud infrastructure and with several 
quick alterations, and assessment/confirmation of 
complying with security needs, the VPM team has made 
it such that the spacecraft can be flown from anywhere 
there is an internet connection. This is the first time an 
Air Force owned and operated spacecraft has used 
commercial ground service providers, cloud-based 
operations, and remotely operated a spacecraft. 
Given the demonstration from this mission, and the 
versatility it has provided in adverse conditions (a 
pandemic), future missions are likely to be operated this 
way, as security postures allow. 
However, there are always numerous elements of the 
program and SSP’s approach that could have been better. 
Some of the most important take-aways from SSP’s 
approach are as follows: 
• Survive a Tumble: Designing spacecraft to 
operate through a tumble, as was the design 
guidance for SSP missions [6], is not only too 
driving to the design but it is often not done 
with vendor supplied spacecraft buses. 
Designing to survive a tumble, with a well-
tested phoenix mode (that can use the charge 
circuitry to charge batteries even if the vehicle 
is off), has proven incredibly important for 
VPM. This is likely to become a standard 
feature. 
• Test the “in-between” times: Day in the life 
testing was, correctly, focused on specific 
elements (e.g. mission success criteria and key 
behaviors) but omitted testing the vehicle’s 
operation when it was simply standing by. The 
behavior between events was not well known 
until the vehicle was left to its own devices in 
orbit. Why should it be expected that a vehicle 
that has never been left on its own to work 
properly in orbit on its own? In the future, SSP 
will likely consider things like total up-time 
vs. max single duration on vs. time spent 
operating between human input. Focusing on 
understanding behaviors, not just debugging 
functionality, is important. 
• There is never enough COMM testing: SSP 
aims to test all of its systems with an end-to-
end (ground and space segment) over the air, 
long range communications test. This verifies 
the link budget and demonstrates that the radio 
configurations are correct. Similar to the 
previous bullet, the flight radio behavior was 
never tested for longer duration, non-
transmitting, operations. VPM also had a 
condensed version of this test (not over the air, 
and compatibility testing for ground system). 
Because this system is effectively the most 
important to do anything else with the 
spacecraft, it should receive commensurate 
attention and time.  
• Modular design with expectation that 
interfaces are immature: Expecting that 
interface maturation will occur during the 
system integration process (hopefully on a 
flatsat instead of the flight unit(s)). Enabling 
the team to quickly add to, or modify, the 
interfaces to bring the system together 
accelerates the overall integration process to 
meet design intent. 
• Flight software/ground software 
configurability is fundamental to agility: 
Making sure that the mission team has access 
to, and can configure as needed, the software 
systems allow flexibility to uncertainty and the 
ability to achieve objectives as capability 
comes on-line. When integrating “black-box” 
subsystems into an integrated system, modular 
software allows changes to occur, minimizing 
schedule impacts compared to fixing the 
black-box. Further, a configurable system 
allows flexibility to put off lower priority 
objectives to later, producing an agile 
experimentation platform. 
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Beyond the formulated take-aways, there are multiple 
on-going issues and performance studies that the team 
continues to assess. The planned non-volatile storage, an 
industrial grade SD card, failed several weeks into 
operations and telemetry was remapped to RAM. The 
radio also has demonstrated challenging, intermittent 
behavior that has been partially corrected through fault 
protection improvements within the flight software; root 
cause or more permanent corrections other than "reset" 
are still being assessed. Finally, SSP is considering how 
to better end-to-end verify the critical elements involved 
in the detumble process which would improve 
confidence in achieving higher level functionality more 
quickly in the mission. Sensor/actuator functionality and 
performance testing may be a reasonable step or even 
full Helmholtz cage verification; complexity and 
accuracy of ground based testing for these activities are 
in debate. 
Future Outlook 
A continual thread of development in the Small Satellite 
Portfolio is the concept of path-agnostic 
communications. At the mission level, SSP is not relying 
on a single path, network or radio to deliver mission data 
to the user. By exploring commercial and government 
ground networks and satellite to satellite 
communications, overall geographic and temporal 
vulnerability can be reduced. VPM contributed to this 
Portfolio vision by incorporating the evaluation of 
commercial satellite ground networks as a mission 
objective. This process presented unique challenges and 
opportunities as a US Air Force owned and operated 
mission but has been extremely successful to date. 
VPM's demonstration has opened the possibility for 
commercial ground to play an integral role in the larger 
TT&C architecture of the Small Satellite Portfolio. The 
commercial ground networks are tied to a cloud-based 
operations system designed and built in tandem with the 
VPM mission. A significant systems engineering 
endeavor in its own right, this cloud-based operations 
suite allowed near instantaneous reaction to the COVID-
19 crisis, allowing secure, remote access to the 
operations center from off-site locations. A fully remote, 
virtualized operations center, while not an initial 
requirement to meet the DSX augmentation mission, has 
been an example of reactive, agile development with 
lasting value. 
VPM is currently being operated remotely with 
significantly reduced need for operators, but 
improvements are continuously being identified and 
integrated into the flight and ground systems to eliminate 
the need for an operator. The flight system has several 
key features that ground automation is able to utilize to 
replace operator tasks: automatic telemetry downlinking 
and command queue management on a per command 
basis (instead of a per pass basis). Automatic telemetry 
downlinks are managed by the flight system based on the 
spacecraft mode and are easily configurable. Automatic 
downlinks prioritize telemetry generated when the link 
is active and fill the remaining bandwidth with stored 
telemetry; this allows automation to perform verification 
steps quickly while downlinking stored state of health 
telemetry. The command management of the flight 
software allows for individual commands or command 
sequences to be added or removed from the schedule; all 
the telemetry required to identify individual commands 
is able to be requested. The ground system is currently 
using these features to automatically synchronize ground 
schedules to the spacecraft by adding or removing 
individual commands from the schedule. Each command 
in the ground schedule is given a time-to-live where the 
synchronization automation will attempt to add it to the 
satellite command queue and ensure the command stays 
in the queue until it has been executed. These features 
have helped reduce VPM operations staffing from 
around 17 FTE in the initial month of operations, to less 
than one FTE since that time, even while the vehicle was 
still being commissioned. Further automation features 
are actively being developed and can be quickly 
implemented and iterated on due to the abstract, modular 
frameworks of both the flight and ground systems. 
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